The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett's (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett's criticism of what he calls a "Cartesian Theater". We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. We believe that some of these requirements are violated by GWT, but not all, hence there is partial incompatibility with MDM, and it is nonsense to answer if GWT is or is not a Cartesian Theater. However, by asking such question we conclude that the issues around this discussion involve fuzzy claims about degrees of consciousness and we show how the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model (NAIM) is fit for solving such conceptual issues.
Introduction
Bernard Baars is a psychologist who proposed the Global Workspace Theory (GWT; Baars, 1998) . The theory proposes that consciousness is a functional workspace that broadcasts information widely across the brain. Baars (1997) further claims that such global workspace can be understood metaphorically as a working theater. Daniel Dennett (1991) is a philosopher that criticizes a model of consciousness he calls "The Cartesian Theater", replacing it with his own theory, the Multiple Drafts Model (MDM; 1991; or "fame in the brain", 2001). Dennett claims that there is no central theater 'where it all comes together', no finish line for the onset of consciousness, and that consciousness is accomplished by a society of specialized neural assemblies influencing behavior.
GWT has influenced many works on consciousness, making Franklin, D'Mello, Baars & Ramamurthy (2009) characterize it as the 'current leading cognitive theory of consciousness'. Recent papers about the GWT have taken more of a scientific (as opposed to philosophical) direction, with more evidence being taken into account (Baars, 2002; Edelman, Gally & Baars, 2011) . Also, other models have adopted aspects of this theory (Dehaene, Kerszberg & Changeux 1998; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) and some researchers proposed the implementation of the theory in machines (Franklin, D'Mello, Baars & Ramamurthy, 2009; Madl, Baars & Franklin, 2011 ). Dennett's theory had some repercussion in the following years including criticism (Block, 1993 (Block, , 1995 Tye 1993) and support (Rosenthal, 1993) . Somewhat more recent papers have been criticizing Dennett's proposal of abolishing a finish line for the onset of consciousness (O'Brien & Opie, 1999; Christie & Barresi, 2002; Schneider, 2007; Todd, 2006; 2009) . Both theories have received much attention and continue to be listed in most introduction to consciousness guides (Blackmore, 2005; Velmans & Schneider 2007; Zelazo, Moscovitch & Thompson, 2007) .
At first glance, the two theories seem to be conceptually opposed, regarding the existence of a central processing instance; however, there are also many similarities between them, since MDM is complemented by a serial processing modality named "The Joycean Machine" (Dennett, 1991) .
